Which of the following is an assumption of the electoral competition model?
|
A typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share. Here we use Euro-barometer survey data and European elite-study data from 1979 for the Netherlands and Germany to construct a stochastic model of voter response, based on multinomial probit estimation. For each of these countries, we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model. The latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics. The pure spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a stochastic function of party positions. We use these models to perform a thought experiment so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions. We go on to propose a model of internal party decision-making based both on pre-election electoral estimation and post-election coalition bargaining. This model suggests why the various parties in the period in question did not adopt vote maximizing positions. We argue that maximizing expected vote will not, in general, be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based on proportional representation. Show
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves. This paper is based on research supported by NSF Grants SBR 94-22548 and 96-17708. Versions of this research have been presented at the Public Choice Meeting, San Francisco, March 1997, at the European Public Choice Meeting, Prague, April 1997, and at the Political Science Seminar, New York University, May 1997. This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution. Buying optionsChapter EUR 29.95 Price includes VAT (Singapore)
eBookEUR 139.09Price includes VAT (Singapore)
Softcover BookEUR 169.99Price excludes VAT (Singapore)
Hardcover BookEUR 169.99Price excludes VAT (Singapore)
Learn about institutional subscriptions PreviewUnable to display preview. Download preview PDF. Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF. Albert, J.H. and Chib, S. (1993). Bayesian analysis of binary and polychotomous response data. Journal of the American Statistical Association 88: 669–679. CrossRef Google Scholar Alvarez, R.M. and Nagler, J. (1996). Correlated disturbances in discrete choice models: A comparison of multinomial probit models and logit models. Typescript. Pasadena: California Institute of Technology. Google Scholar Aranson, P., Hinich, M. and Ordeshook, P. (1974). Election goals and strategies: Equivalent and non-equivalent candidate objectives. American Political Science Review 68: 135–152. CrossRef Google Scholar Axelrod, R. (1970). Conflict of interest. Chicago: Markham. Google Scholar Budge, I., Robertson, D. and Hearl, D. (Eds.). (1987). Ideology, strategy and party change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar Chib, S. and Greenberg, E. (1996). Multinomial probit by Markov Chain Monte Carlo. Typescript. Washington University in St. Louis. Google Scholar Coughlin, P. (1992). Probabilistic voting theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRef Google Scholar Cox, G.W. (1984). An expected utility model of electoral competition. Quality and Quantity 18: 337–349. CrossRef Google Scholar Cox, G.W. (1987). The uncovered set and the core. American Journal of Political Science 408–422. Google Scholar de Swaan, A. (1973). Coalition theories and cabinet formations. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Google Scholar Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row. Google Scholar Duverger, J. (1954). Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state. New York: Wiley. Google Scholar Duverger, J. (1984). Which is the best electoral system? In A. Lijphart and B. Grofman (Eds.), Choosing an electoral system. New York: Praeger. Google Scholar Endow, J.M. and Hinich, J.J. (1984). The spatial theory of voting: An introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar Feddersen, T.J. (1992). A voting model implying Duverger’s law and positive turnout. American Journal of Political Science 34: 1005–1016. CrossRef Google Scholar Herman, V. and Pope, J. (1973). Minority governments in western democracies. British Journal of Political Science 3: 191–212. CrossRef Google Scholar Hinich, M.J. (1977). Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact. Journal of Economic Theory 16: 208–219. CrossRef Google Scholar Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. Economic Journal 39: 41–57. CrossRef Google Scholar ISEIUM. (1983). European elections study: European political parties’ middle-level elites. Europa-Institut, Universitat Mannheim. Google Scholar Kass, R.E. and Raftery, A.E. (1995). Bayes factors. Journal of the American Statistical Association 90: 773–795. CrossRef Google Scholar Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. Harlow: Longman. Google Scholar Kramer, G.H. (1978). Existence of electoral equilibrium. In P. Ordeshook (Ed.), Game theory and political science. New York: New York University Press. Google Scholar Laver, M. and Schofield, N. (1990). Multiparty governments. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar Lin, T., Enelow, J. and Dorussen, H. (1996). Equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting. Typescript. University of Texas, Austin. Google Scholar Martin, A.D. and Quinn, K.M. (1997). Evaluating theories of West German voting behavior. Typescript. Washington University in St. Louis. Google Scholar McCulloch, R. and Rossi. P.E. (1994). An exact likelihood analysis of the multinomial probit model. Journal of Econometrics 64: 207–240. CrossRef Google Scholar McKelvey, R.D. (1986). Covering, dominance and institution-free properties of social choice. American Journal of Political Science 30: 283–314. CrossRef Google Scholar McKelvey, R.D. and Schofield, N. (1986). Structural instability of the core. Journal of Mathematical Economics 15: 179–198. CrossRef Google Scholar Osborne, M.J. (1993). Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition. Games and Economic Behavior 5: 133–151. CrossRef Google Scholar Osborne, M.J. (1995). Spatial models of political competition under plurality rule: A survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and the positions they take. Canadian Journal of Economics 28: 261–301. CrossRef Google Scholar Poole, K.T. and Rosenthal, H. (1991). Patterns of congressional voting. American Journal of Political Science 35: 228–278. CrossRef Google Scholar Quinn, K.M., Martin, A.D. and Whitford, A.B. (1996). Explaining voter choice in a multiparty democracy: A look at data from the Netherlands. Typescript. Washington University in St. Louis. Google Scholar Rabier, J.-R. and Inglehardt, R. (1981). Eurobarometer 11. April 1979: The Year of the Child in Europe Ann Arbor: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Google Scholar Riker, W. (1962). The theory of political coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press. Google Scholar Riker, W.H. (1982). The two-party system and Duverger’s Law: An essay in the history of political science. American Political Science Review 76: 753–766. CrossRef Google Scholar Saari, D. (1996). The generic existence of a core for q-rules. Economic Theory 9: 219–260. Google Scholar Schofield, N. (1985). Social choice and democracy. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. CrossRef Google Scholar Schofield, N. (1986). Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule. Public Choice 51: 267–284. CrossRef Google Scholar Schofield, N. (1993). Political competition in multiparty coalition governments. European Journal of Political Research 23: 1–33. CrossRef Google Scholar Schofield, N. (1995a). Existence of a smooth social choice functor. In W. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles, and N. Schofield (Eds.), Social Choice, Welfare and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar Schofield, N. (1995b). Coalition politics: A formal model and empirical analysis. Journal of Theoretical Politics 7: 245–281. CrossRef Google Scholar Schofield, N. (1996). The heart of a polity. In N. Schofield (Ed.), Collective decision making: Social choice and political economy. Boston: Kluwer. CrossRef Google Scholar Schofield, N. (1997a). Multiparty electoral politics. In D. Mueller (Ed.), Perspectives on public choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar Schofield, N. (1997b). The C 1 topology on the space of smooth preference profiles. Social Choice and Welfare (forthcoming). Google Scholar Schofield, N. and Parks, R. (1996). Existence of a Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining. Typescript. Washington University in St. Louis. Google Scholar Schofield, N., Sened, I. and Nixon, D. (1997). Nash equilibrium in multi-party competition with ‘stochastic’ voters. Annals of Operations Research (forthcoming). Google Scholar Taylor, M. and Laver, M. (1973). Government coalitions in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research I: 205–248. CrossRef Google Scholar Wada, J. and Schofield, N. (1996). Bargaining in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. In N. Schofield (Ed.), Collective decision-making: Social choice and political economy. Boston: Kluwer. Google Scholar Download references Author informationAuthors and Affiliations
Authors
Editor informationEditors and Affiliations
Rights and permissionsReprints and Permissions Copyright information© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht About this chapterCite this chapterSchofield, N., Martin, A.D., Quinn, K.M., Whitford, A.B. (1998). Multiparty electoral competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A model based on multinomial probit. In: Hinich, M.J., Munger, M.C. (eds) Empirical Studies in Comparative Politics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5127-7_3 Which of the following is true of a winner take all electoral system quizlet?Which of the following is true of the winner-take-all system? In this system, the candidate who receives the largest popular vote in a state is credited with all that state's electoral votes.
Which of the following occurs in a proportional representation electoral system quizlet?Which of the following occurs in a proportional representation electoral system? Political parties win seats in a legislature based on the proportion of the vote they receive.
What are the three most major factors that influence a voters choice?The three cleavage-based voting factors focused on in research are class, gender and religion. Firstly, religion is often a factor which influences one's party choice.
Which of the following statements tend to explain why turnout is higher in competitive elections quizlet?Which of the following tend to explain why turnout is higher in competitive elections? Voters know about the candidates in competitive elections.
|
